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In Benedict Spinoza’s time, defenders of republican or popular forms of government were compelled to explain what makes a republic 
superior to other regime forms. Contemporary democratic theorists con-
front a similar question: what makes democratic governing procedures 
superior to alternative procedures? A typical approach to this question 
in Spinoza’s time and ours is to appeal to some norm (for example, fair-
ness or liberty) that is intrinsically and uniquely satisfied by democratic 
governing procedures. For instance, some early modern republicans 
defend popular governance by arguing that liberty is only possible in 
a self-governing state. Indeed, some claim that liberty is constituted 
by republican citizenship. Several commentators have assumed that 
Spinoza was a typical republican in this respect.1
 In this paper, I will argue that at the core of Spinoza’s political theory 
is an instrumental, rather than an intrinsic, defense of democratic pro-
cedures. Specifically, Spinoza embraces democratic decision procedures 
primarily because they tend to result in better decisions, defined relative 
to a procedure-independent standard of correctness or goodness. In con-
temporary terms, Spinoza embraces an epistemic defense of democracy. 
In what follows, I will examine Spinoza’s defense of collective governance, 
showing not only how it differs from other accounts of his time but also 
how it might contribute to current debates about the epistemic standing 
of popular governing bodies. The paper is divided into three sections. In 
the opening section, I defend the thesis that has been contested in recent 
years that Spinoza was, in fact, a consistent democrat. The second section 
focuses on procedural (that is, intrinsic) defenses of democracy, paying 
particular attention to the republican version of proceduralism that 
was prominent in Spinoza’s time. Here I argue that Spinoza’s defense 
of democracy was not principally procedural; democratic procedures 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for securing political liberty. And in 
the final section, I present my case for reading Spinoza as an epistemic 
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democrat. Here I compare his epistemic defense with contemporary ver-
sions. What we find are not only striking anticipations of contemporary 
arguments but also largely neglected lines of argumentation that reveal 
both the potential epistemic advantages of democracy and the ways in 
which these advantages can be undermined.
1. Was sPinoza a Democrat?
It is widely assumed that Spinoza’s commitment to democracy was 
a rather uneasy one. lewis Feuer, for instance, claims that Spinoza’s 
democratic theory was “divided against itself,” due to his “feelings of 
withdrawal” and “mistrust of the multitude.” leo Strauss, too, paints 
Spinoza as a very reluctant democrat with a dim view of the masses 
and a belief in an “unbridgeable gulf” between the wise and the vulgar. 
This interpretation is nourished by Spinoza’s repeated suggestion that 
common people cannot be expected to exercise reason and good judg-
ment; they are ineluctably mired in superstition and prejudice. But even 
if Spinoza was not a spirited populist, his commitment to democracy in 
his first political treatise, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (hereafter 
TTP), remains quite evident.2
 However, there is some disagreement about whether Spinoza still 
believed in the superiority of democracy by the time he wrote the later 
Tractatus Politicus (hereafter TP). The textual evidence on this matter is 
rather limited, in part because the TP remained unfinished at the time 
of Spinoza’s death on February 21, 1677. The work ends just as he had 
begun the first of what would likely have been two chapters devoted to 
democracy. Feuer has raised the possibility that it is no mere accident 
that the chapters on democracy remain unfinished: “Did he come to a 
dead halt, unable to affirm that democratic faith which had animated 
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus? Did he stop before an insoluble, 
insuperable problem, baffled by the mob, by the shadows of the slaves 
dancing around the mangled body of John de Witt” (Spinoza and the 
Rise of Liberalism, 151; cf. 196). The reference here is to the brutal mur-
ders of Johan de Witt, the former republican Grand Pensionary (chief 
statesman and legal advisor), and his brother Cornelius at the hands of 
a zealous mob in 1672. Spinoza was a great admirer of Johan De Witt’s 
leadership and his campaign of “true freedom” (ware vrijheid), and his 
murder apparently elicited uncommon outrage in Spinoza.3 on Feuer’s 
narrative, this horrific event left Spinoza with an even deeper distrust 
of the masses, and this shift in attitude partially explains why Spinoza 
wrote another political treatise (ibid., chap. 5). ultimately, Feuer leaves 
us with a picture of Spinoza as fundamentally conflicted, torn between 
a fear of despotism and a fear of populism.
 raia Prokhovnik has maintained even more pointedly that Spinoza 
had abandoned his advocacy of democracy by the time he wrote the TP. 
She claims that in the later treatise Spinoza evidently preferred aris-
tocracy.4 like Feuer, Prokhovnik argues that there is a “marked shift in 
the course of Spinoza’s political writings, away from democracy” (“From 
Democracy to Aristocracy,” 109), though she speculates less about the 
historical and psychological reasons for this. Prokhovnik places most 
of the weight of her claim on Spinoza’s apparent approval in the later 
treatise for a certain form of decentralized aristocracy.
 I do not think that there is much evidence to support the view that 
Spinoza grew to prefer aristocracy to democracy by the end of his life.5 
Quite obviously, praise for one regime form in no way precludes equal 
or greater approval for another, so we should not assume that by laud-
ing a certain form of aristocracy, Spinoza is rejecting democracy. And 
when Spinoza explicitly compares the relative virtues of democracy 
and aristocracy, he makes it clear that democracies are generally to 
be preferred.6 He claims that democracies are the most absolute form 
of government (TP 11/1, 8/3),7 which for him means that they are the 
most stable, cohesive, and harmonious. And while Spinoza does note 
that a government composed of a small group of well-bred patricians 
may be superior to a democracy in theory, in reality the self-serving and 
divisive practices of these elites undermine any theoretical advantages 
that this regime form might possess. I will return to this point later in 
the paper. What I wish to underscore here is just that when Spinoza 
directly addresses the question of the comparative value of democracies 
and aristocracies in the TP, democracies are presented as superior.
 Feuer’s claim that the TP reveals a greater scorn and distrust of 
the masses than the earlier treatise also strikes me an unfounded.8 In 
both works Spinoza expresses views that may be interpreted as elitist 
or antiegalitarian, but he is also highly critical of those who wish to 
exclude the masses from political involvement. In an important passage 
to which I will return later, Spinoza criticizes those who would blame 
individuals rather than political institutions for the poor judgments of 
common people (TP 7/27). So, while he does not regard the masses with 
cheery optimism—and who did in his times?—nor did he come to regard 
widespread participation as a political liability. rather, for reasons that 
we will explore in section three, he thought that the people could, under 
favorable conditions, govern relatively wisely. And this approval of the 
collective wisdom of the masses is even more pronounced in the TP than 
it is in the TTP.
 one matter on which I agree with Prokhovnik is that “secure institu-
tional foundations, rather than the particular form of the relationship 
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between ruler and ruled, is the factor to which Spinoza attributes the 
success of states” (“From Democracy to Aristocracy,” 108).9 The way 
in which the state is organized is more important than regime type. 
However, when we look at the organizational recommendations that 
Spinoza makes, we find that they are effectively democratic, by which 
I mean they foster the participation of the masses in governance and 
lead to the diffusion of political power. As etienne Balibar notes, in the 
TP Spinoza gives us more than a theory of democracy: he provides us 
with a “theory of democratization, which is valid for every regime.”10 It 
is not in his stinted commentary on democracy but in his presentation 
of democratized versions of monarchy and aristocracy that we find Spi-
noza’s greatest defense of popular governance. rather than abandoning 
the democratic views of the TTP, Spinoza actually seems to expand his 
theory of democracy to apply even to regimes that are not themselves 
nominal democracies.
2. sPinoza anD ProceDural Defenses of Democracy
In my view, then, we have good reason to believe that Spinoza was a 
consistent democrat. The question that we want to ask now is why Spi-
noza was a democrat. on what grounds does Spinoza base his defense of 
democracy? Defenses of democracy may appeal to the intrinsically good 
features of democratic procedures, the good consequences that follow 
from such procedures, or to a combination of intrinsic and instrumental 
features. Those who rest their defense exclusively on the intrinsic fea-
tures of the procedures are often referred to as “proceduralists.” Those 
who appeal to consequences that follow from such procedures are often 
dubbed “instrumentalists.”11
 According to a proceduralist line of defense, democratic procedures 
intrinsically satisfy some ideal or norm better than alternatives. one 
of the appealing features of proceduralism is that, unlike instrumen-
talism, it does not depend on identifying an independent standard by 
which we can judge the quality of outcomes. Indeed, the fact of broad 
disagreement about substantive political matters is sometimes invoked 
in defense of proceduralism, for if there is no widely accepted standard 
of just or good outcomes, then—so the argument runs—we ought to be 
primarily concerned with procedural norms.12
 Among the norms invoked by proceduralists are fairness, equality 
(Thomas Christiano), reciprocity or mutual respect (Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson),13 and freedom (Carol Gould).14 I wish to focus my 
attention on this last norm, for reasons that will become clear momen-
tarily. Michael Sandel, for instance, has defended the view that there is 
an internal connection between living in a republic, or a self-governing 
state, and being free. He claims that, according to the republican view 
that he defends, “liberty is understood as a consequence of self-govern-
ment. I am free insofar as I am a member of a political community that 
controls its own fate.”15 Philip Pettit, too, has argued that there is an 
intrinsic connection between liberty and democratic self-governance. He 
maintains that freedom from domination depends on the existence of 
certain republican institutions, which embody democratic principles.16 
Indeed, he contends that such institutions not only provide conditions in 
which liberty can be cultivated, they positively constitute such liberty:
The presence of certain antibodies in your blood makes it the case 
that you are immune to a certain disease, but it does not cause your 
immunity. . . . [B]y analogy, the presence in the polity of such and such 
empowering and protective arrangements makes it the case that you 
are more or less immune to arbitrary interference, but it does not 
cause that immunity; it constitutes it.17
To be sure, Pettit is not claiming here that living in any nominal de-
mocracy makes one free, ipso facto. rather, he is claiming that if certain 
institutional conditions are in place and if certain additional conditions 
obtain in civil society, membership in such a republic will constitute 
one’s freedom.18
 The claim that Sandel and Pettit make, in somewhat different ways,19 
is that being a citizen in a well-ordered democracy is both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for liberty. It is a necessary condition because, 
in any other form of governance, the people are at the mercy of the rul-
ers. It is a sufficient condition because, in a well-structured democracy, 
one is free from domination or arbitrary rule, which is what republican 
liberty denotes.
 By understanding liberty in this way, Sandel and Pettit self-conscious-
ly situate themselves within a rich history of republican thought that 
spans back to ancient times. This way of defending popular governance 
was rather prominent in Spinoza’s time.20 roman republicanism was 
revived in the renaissance period, most notably by Niccolo Machiavelli. 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli argues that individual liberty is bound 
up with social liberty; one cannot be free from the domination of others 
unless one lives in a free polity (vivere libero), a republic.21 This way of 
conceiving of liberty was embraced by a number of seventeenth-century 
British thinkers.22
 one also finds traces of this view in the pamphlet literature in sup-
port of the Dutch revolt from the Spanish Hapsburgs at the end of the 
sixteenth century and in the Dutch republican literature that emerged 
in the middle of the seventeenth century.23 While these works do not 
contain the sort of careful, sustained republican theorizing that one finds 
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in, say, Machiavelli or Harrington, they do present a nostalgic vision 
of ancient Batavian freedom, which was secured when their ancestors 
(the tribal Batavi) parried the advances of the romans. And the ideal 
of republican liberty became especially important in the Netherlands 
during the period of 1650–72 when the united Provinces governed 
without a stadholder, or monarchical figure. During this period, Pieter 
de la Court, a Dutch republican whose writings profoundly influenced 
Spinoza, referred to monarchs as “base and slavish opposers of liberty.”24 
He maintained that the Dutch people “became not free but by the 
death of the last stadholder and captain general,” for only then were 
they “subject to none of what quality soever, but only to reason, and to 
the laws of their own country” (True Interest and Political Maxims, 11, 
381). In short, republicans throughout early modern europe—including 
two of the figures who most influenced Spinoza: Machiavelli and De la 
Court—had defended popular governance on the grounds that only in a 
republic does one preserve one’s liberty. In other words, they defended 
republics on procedural grounds in the sense described above. This gives 
us some circumstantial reasons to expect that Spinoza might himself 
invoke this form of procedural defense in favor of democracy.
 There are some passages that would seem to suggest that Spinoza did 
indeed adopt a procedural, republican defense. For instance, at several 
points in the TTP, he declares that democracies are the most natural 
form of government and that they best preserve our natural liberty and 
equality (for example, TTP 16/202, III/195; TTP 20/257, III/244). This 
suggests that democracies, by their very nature, best satisfy the politi-
cal norms of liberty and equality. The republican overtones are most 
pronounced when he writes the following: “[subordination] has no place 
in a society whose government is in the hands of all and where laws 
are made by common consent. In such a society, whether the number 
of laws is increased or reduced, the people remain just as free, since 
they are not acting under the authority of another but by their own 
proper consent” (TTP 5/73, III/74).25 The claim here is quintessentially 
republican: popular forms of governance preserve the natural liberty of 
their citizens because, in them, one is able to participate in one’s own 
governance.26 Passages like these have led scholars like Prokhovnik to 
claim that, in the TTP, Spinoza holds that “the liberty of subjects in civil 
society is guaranteed by the state, by its being self-governing” (Spinoza 
and Republicanism, 204).27
 on the whole, though, Spinoza’s adoption of the proceduralist line 
is rather half-hearted, at best.28 He generally denies that there is an 
intrinsic connection between democratic citizenship and freedom. For 
instance, he criticizes those who thought that by making Holland a 
republic the Dutch would ipso facto recover their freedom: “the people 
of Holland thought that to regain their freedom they had only to se-
cede from their count and cut off the head of the body politic; they 
never thought of reorganizing their state, but left all its other parts in 
their original form” (TP 9/14). living in a democracy is not a sufficient 
guarantee of freedom. Nor is it necessary that one live in a democracy 
in order to be free. Spinoza states unequivocally in the TP that “people 
can preserve quite a considerable degree of freedom under a king” (TP 
7/31). In short, Spinoza in general denies that democratic citizenship is 
either a necessary or sufficient condition for being free. What matters 
most for Spinoza is the quality of the legislation, not the source of it.
 A striking expression of this point comes in TTP XVI. Here Spinoza 
maintains that one always stands under the authority (sub potestate) 
of the state, irrespective of regime form. However, one’s dependency on 
the authority of the sovereign—whether monarchical or popular—does 
not reduce one to a condition of servitude, since what really matter are 
the outcomes of the laws, specifically, whether one’s welfare is served:
[I]t is not acting on command in itself that makes someone a slave, 
but rather the reason for so acting. If the purpose of the action is not 
his own advantage but that of the ruler, then the agent is indeed a 
slave and useless to himself. But in a state where the safety of the 
whole people, not that of the ruler is the supreme law, he who obeys 
the sovereign in all things should not be called a slave useless to 
himself but rather a subject. The freest state, therefore, is that whose 
laws are founded on sound reason; for there each man can be free 
whenever he wishes. (TTP 16/201, III/194–95)
What we will see in the next section is that Spinoza does think that 
democratic decision procedures are more likely than alternatives to re-
sult in wise or salutary laws, laws that serve the general good. Here it 
was sufficient to point out that, despite circumstantial reasons to expect 
Spinoza to defend democracy on procedural, republican grounds, in fact, 
Spinoza largely eschews this line of argumentation, and in this respect 
at least, he deviates from at least a certain strand of republicanism.
3. sPinoza as ePistemic Democrat
In the preceding section, I noted in passing that one of the appeals of 
procedural defenses of democracy is that such accounts may remain 
agnostic about the quality of the outcomes that follow from democratic 
decision procedures; that is, proceduralists need not establish the supe-
riority of democratic policies or legislation relative to objective standards 
of justice or goodness. on a procedural account, what matters are simply 
the norms that democracies are thought to embody. But by avoiding 
problems surrounding how we measure substantive justice, pure pro-
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ceduralism faces its own problem, since it is not clear that procedural 
norms are sufficient for defending democratic governance.
 In recent years, David estlund has suggested that alternative, non-
democratic decision procedures can equally well satisfy norms such as 
fairness and equal respect. Democracies do not have a monopoly on 
procedural fairness; flipping a coin or adopting some other randomized 
selection method equally satisfies a concern for fairness. But, despite 
being fair, random decision procedures do not give us much reason to 
comply with such decisions.29 If one wishes to offer a full defense of 
democracies, one must look beyond procedural norms.30 one must look 
to the epistemic merits of democracy.
 epistemic defenses are instrumentalist—that is, they appeal to the 
products of democratic procedures rather than to the intrinsic features 
of these procedures. Specifically, epistemic defenses make at least the 
following three claims: (1) for at least some political choices, there are if 
not facts of the matter about what ought to be done at least objectively 
better or worse decisions;31 (2) good or just outcomes are defined inde-
pendently of any procedure. otherwise put, what is good or just is not 
constituted by its being the product of a collective will, no matter how 
this will is aggregated;32 and (3) democratic decision procedures will be 
better than alternatives at producing just or good results.
 We noted in the previous section one problem with epistemic defenses, 
namely, that they depend on an objective standard of goodness or justice, 
for which there is certainly no existing consensus. of course, the absence 
of consensus is not grounds for abandoning the claim of objectivity, but 
real problems remain concerning how we establish or identify such a 
standard and how we measure outcomes against it. We can sidestep this 
problem to some extent if there are independent reasons for supposing 
that democracies make reliably better decisions than other procedures. 
But why should we suppose that the masses exercise reliably better 
judgment that other decision procedures?
 To see how one might answer this question, I propose that we look 
to Spinoza. Some will undoubtedly look askance at such a proposal. 
After all, how could the same person who discouraged common people 
from reading the TTP because “the constancy of the common people is 
obstinacy. . . . [T]hey are not governed by reason but swayed by impulse 
in approving or finding fault” (preface/12, III/14) also have faith in the 
wisdom of crowds? Steven Smith’s remarks on the character of Spinoza’s 
defense of democracy may be taken as representative of a skeptical 
position. He writes, “Ironically, Spinoza, the first avowed defender of 
democracy, did not hold any great confidence in the wisdom, actual or 
potential, of the people as a whole” (Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Ques-
tion of Jewish Identity, 121), adding in a more recent work that Spinoza 
believes in neither the “the superior wisdom of popular assemblies” nor 
the “virtues of deliberation” (Spinoza’s Book of Life, 132). While I can 
understand why Smith holds such views—after all, Spinoza certainly 
did not believe that most people were likely to become rational or to 
exercise consistently good judgment—this characterization is, in fact, 
misguided. Spinoza did believe in the superior wisdom of democratic 
bodies, for reasons that are interesting and instructive.
 For instance, despite his claims about the limited rationality of the 
average person, Spinoza makes it clear that he regards deliberation as a 
powerful tool for bringing new information and new perspectives to light 
and for improving our grounds for belief in general. In one particularly 
inspired, and arguably overblown, passage, Spinoza writes, “[T]he fact 
is that human wits are too blunt to get to the heart of all problems im-
mediately; but they are sharpened by the give and take of discussion and 
debate, and by exploring every possible course men eventually discover 
the measures they wish, measures which all approve and which no 
one would have thought of before the discussion” (TP 9/14). And while 
Spinoza recognizes that deliberative decision-making bodies may be 
inefficient, he concludes that this downside is more than offset by the 
improvement in the quality of decisions that follow vigorous debate 
(ibid.).
 This is especially true when the deliberating body is sizable.33 This 
explains why Spinoza claims in the TTP that “there is less reason in a 
democratic state to fear absurd proceedings. For it is almost impossible 
that the majority of a large assembly would agree on the same irratio-
nal decision” (TTP 16/200–1; III/194). After exposure to a wide range of 
views, members of a large deliberative group are at least likely to avoid 
very bad decisions and may well converge on good decisions.
 The potential epistemic advantages of sizeable deliberative bodies 
have been duly noted in the contemporary work on democracy.34 But 
while the epistemic upside to deliberation appears to be considerable, 
there is also plenty of evidence that deliberation can also amplify confu-
sion and confound judgment. Cass Sunstein, for instance, has highlighted 
a number of studies that reveal how susceptible deliberative bodies are 
to group-think, information cascades, suppressed profiles, and ideologi-
cal amplification.35
 Was Spinoza aware of the ways in which deliberation might un-
dermine judgment? His suggestion that a postdeliberative majority is 
almost certain to avoid irrational decisions suggests that perhaps he 
was not sufficiently attuned to this concern. But even if passages like 
this indicate that Spinoza might be too sanguine about democratic deci-
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sion making, he was surely aware of the psychological propensities that 
threaten deliberation. He had, of course, witnessed the “mob mentality” 
that led to the de Witt murders. And he delineates in great detail in 
Ethics III the very psychological mechanism that leads to conformity 
and ideological amplification—namely, our tendency to imitate the 
affects and judgments of others (e IIIP27, II/160 ff.).36 And it is clear 
that Spinoza recognizes the threat of conformism and of corrosive 
social influences in general. Indeed, the TTP, Spinoza’s great paean to 
independence of thought, may be read as a guide for protection against 
such influences. The greatest threat to independence of judgment is 
religious superstition,37 which engulfs and clouds the mind. This is why 
most of the TTP is devoted to undercutting religion’s claim to authority 
in both theoretical and political matters.
 Moreover, Spinoza takes superstition itself to be a byproduct of fear. He 
states quite emphatically in the preface to the TTP that “fear is the root 
from which superstition is born. . . . [P]eople are swayed by credulity only 
so long as they are afraid” (preface/4, III/6).38 So, only if we can diminish 
the conditions that give rise to fear can we hope to restrain superstition. 
In short, Spinoza is quite insistent that certain environmental conditions 
must be met in order to have any hope of protecting the independence 
of thought on which group rationality depends. In conditions of fear, we 
cannot hope to deliberate productively and judge clearly. And as long as 
people are fearful and superstitious, we certainly cannot take consensus 
or a close approximation thereof as evidence of correctness.
 So, when Spinoza claims that “it is almost impossible that the majority 
of a large assembly would agree on the same irrational decision” (TTP 
16/200–1; III/194), he must be envisioning a situation where the decision 
is made under relatively good cognitive conditions (that is, conditions 
where manipulation, fear, pressures to conform, etc., are negligible and 
where there is good access to information). If decisions are made under 
fearful conditions—in which participants are likely to have their judg-
ments distorted by superstition—we cannot put nearly as much faith 
in majority opinions. This position carries interesting implications for 
understanding Spinoza’s defense of deliberative democracy. on the 
one hand, he seems to think that, under good cognitive conditions, the 
process of deliberation should give democratic assemblies a strong 
epistemic standing. However, he also seems to recognize—or, at least, 
had the resources to recognize—just how contingent these epistemic 
advantages are on the preservation of good cognitive conditions. Specifi-
cally, good collective judgment requires that independence of thought be 
protected, which itself requires that fear and superstition be minimized. 
His epistemic argument, thus, alerts us not only to the potential value 
of democracies but also to the precariousness of this value.
 But, even if we accept that, under relatively good cognitive condi-
tions, democracies will tend to make good decisions, do we have a reason 
to believe that these decisions will be superior to those made by, say, 
educated elites? Spinoza argues that we do, relying on the assumption 
that accountability mechanisms tend to increase the quality of decisions. 
And in democratically organized states, there will generally be greater 
accountability than in other forms of political organization. In regimes 
where the governors do not have to answer to the governed, the ruling 
class will tend to legislate in a self-serving manner, which is likely to come 
at the cost of the general good. As Spinoza succinctly puts it, “[W]hen all 
decisions are made by a few men who have only themselves to please, 
freedom and the common good are lost” (TP 9/14). By contrast, democratic 
accountability enhances the quality of governance by checking the ability 
of political agents to act in a purely self-interested manner. Democracies 
are designed to “avoid the follies of appetite and as much as possible to 
bring men within the limits of reason” (TTP 16/201; III/194).
 one reason why public accountability protects against the “follies of 
appetite” is that the very act of having to justify one’s position in a public 
setting requires that one invoke public rather than private reasons. In 
a revealing passage in which he explains why larger assemblies tend to 
govern rationally, Spinoza writes, “The will of so large a council must be 
determined by reason rather than by caprice; since evil passions draw 
men in different directions, and they can be guided as if by one mind only 
in so far as they aim at ends which are honorable, or at any rate appear 
to be so” (TP 8/6—my emphasis). Spinoza’s point here about being com-
pelled to aim at honorable or apparently honorable ends resembles Jon 
elster’s claim that “in a political debate it is pragmatically impossible 
to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good 
for oneself. By the very act of engaging in a public debate—by arguing 
rather than bargaining—one has ruled out the possibility of invoking 
such reasons.”39 of course, public justification does not necessarily 
prevent one from acting in self-serving ways; it just demands that one 
invoke publicly accessible reasons for pursuing these goals. So, as long 
as there are apparently honorable reasons in favor of a position, one 
can reasonably advance it and seek to persuade others to do likewise. 
While this may leave plenty of room for chicanery, nevertheless, there is 
surely some truth to the suggestion that public justification will serve 
as at least a mild constraint on the follies of appetite.
 In addition to the ways that public justification steers individuals 
toward the common good, Spinoza envisions the adoption of further 
accountability mechanisms designed to increase the quality of political 
decisions. These accountability mechanisms will be more formal and 
likely more effective in a democracy but may exist in a less official 
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manner in other regimes. For instance, in a well-structured monarchy, 
“the king . . . whether motivated by fear of the people or by his desire 
to win over the greater part of an armed populace, or whether he is led 
by nobility of spirit to have regard to the public interest, will always 
ratify the opinion that is supported by most votes” (TP 7/11). That is, 
in a democratized monarchy, the monarch will be compelled to comply 
with certain “fundamental laws” (TP 7/1)40 and will make judgments 
based on the advice of a group of citizen counselors (TP 7/3). And the 
counselors themselves, in order to keep their posts, will have to satisfy 
the interests of the multitudes; their “private fortune and advantage” 
will be made to “depend on the general welfare and the peace of all” (TP 
7/4).
 The basic idea is to structure the state in such a way that generally 
one cannot advance one’s own interests without also advancing the 
interests of others. This notion of balancing interests is at the heart of 
Spinoza’s normative theorizing in the TP.41 In order to keep the inter-
ests of a commonwealth effectively in balance, political power must be 
widely dispersed,42 and the retention of the higher, more powerful, posts 
must be contingent on the perceived success of one’s decision making. 
The most obvious way that this works is by adopting procedures that 
facilitate feedback cycles, like periodic elections, term limits, and the 
rotation of offices, all of which Spinoza recommends.
 These procedures work in part because of certain basic features of 
human psychology, such as ambition (ambitio). Ambition, which Spi-
noza defines as love of esteem (e IIIapp.42),43 leads men to try to obtain 
and retain certain political positions (TP 7/6) and, more generally, to 
“win popularity with the people, governing by kindness rather than by 
fear” (TP 9/14). However, ambition itself may not be a sufficient check 
against the “follies of appetite,” so the lack of formal accountability 
in the cases of monarchies and aristocracies will typically make them 
not only less balanced and less stable than democracies but also less 
rational (TP 11/1).
 It is, I think, one of the more noteworthy features of Spinoza’s 
defense that he recognizes that good judgment depends not only on 
intellectual powers but also on appetitive control. This general point is 
made explicit in his discussion of the relative rationality of aristocra-
cies and democracies:
It is true that, if patricians were of such a nature that in choosing 
their colleagues they could free themselves from all bias and be guided 
only by zeal for the public good, there would be no state to compare 
with aristocracy. But experience has abundantly taught us that the 
very opposite is the case, especially with oligarchies where the will 
of the patricians, in the absence of rivals, is quite unrestrained by 
law. (TP 11/2)
If good judgment depended exclusively on the knowledge that one pos-
sesses, aristocracies would likely outperform democracies, according to 
Spinoza. But, in fact, good judgment depends not only on having true 
beliefs but also on having control over one’s affects. It should be evident, 
then, why Spinoza thinks that a knowledgeable elite will generally 
exhibit worse judgment than a democratic body: they are more suscep-
tible to follies of appetite! The great irony here is that a democracy, of 
all regime forms, is most likely to exhibit control over its own appetites. 
Spinoza effectively upends the Platonic order.44
 By highlighting the ways that accountability mechanisms can boost a 
polity’s epistemic position, Spinoza offers an important line of argument 
that has been largely ignored by contemporary epistemic democrats.45 
And, in doing so, he gives us a greater reason to believe in the epistemic 
prospects of real-world democracies. To understand what I mean, con-
sider the fact that many contemporary epistemic democrats, like Joshua 
Cohen, often rest their defense on the assumption that “voting expresses 
beliefs about what the correct policies are . . . not personal preferences 
for policies” (“An epistemic Conception of Democracy,” 34).46 The reason-
ing here seems to be that democracies could make good on whatever 
epistemic advantages they have only if people actually vote based on 
what they believe to be right or just rather than based on what they 
want. If this were the case, the epistemic defense would depend on highly 
idealized assumptions about human motivation. However, Spinoza sug-
gests that democracies, in fact, have epistemic advantages over other 
regimes not in spite of but because of people’s tendency to act in self-
serving ways. His insights, thus, may significantly fortify the epistemic 
defense, revealing how an apparent weakness of democracies—namely, 
the graspingness of most individuals—may actually be a strength, pro-
vided that certain institutional checks are adopted.
 However, just as we saw with the epistemic potential of delibera-
tion, the epistemic merits of accountability mechanisms depend on the 
existence of relatively good cognitive conditions. For instance, elections 
and rotations of office only effectively regulate the behavior of governors 
if the people are capable of recognizing when their interests are being 
served. This requires that people be moderately competent judges of 
what is good for them, which, in turn, requires that they have access to 
relatively good information on the basis of which they form their judg-
ments.
 Interestingly, Spinoza seems to recognize that mass irrationality is 
largely the product of inadequate access to information. In a remarkable 
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passage in which he defends the involvement of the masses in politics 
against the charge that common people are too stupid and tempestuous 
to participate, Spinoza argues that differences between people’s intel-
lectual and moral capacities are primarily the result of circumstance, 
claiming that “all men share in the same nature; it is power and culture 
that mislead us” (TP 7/27). When it comes to political matters, the pri-
mary reason that most people are poor judges is that leaders tend to be 
obscurantist:
[T]hat “there is no truth or judgment in the common people” is not 
surprising, since the important affairs of state are conducted with-
out their knowledge, and from the little that cannot be concealed 
they can only make conjecture. . . . So to seek to conduct all business 
without the knowledge of the citizens and then to expect them not to 
misjudge things and to put a bad interpretation on everything, this 
is the height of folly. (TP 7/27)
Spinoza follows this observation with a plea for political transparency: 
“it is far better for the honest policies of a state to be open to its enemies 
than for the guilty secrets of tyrants to be kept hidden from the citizens” 
(TP 7/29). Without adequate access to information, the people cannot 
effectively hold leaders accountable, and the epistemic advantage of 
popular participation in governance will be lost.
 Spinoza’s defense of democracy, then, is at once promising and 
sobering. on the one hand, he gives us reason to suppose that large, 
transparent deliberative bodies constrained by accountability mecha-
nisms are likely to make better judgments than other systems of 
governance. However, he also suggests that this advantage is quite 
tenuous, depending heavily on institutions and practices that foster 
good cognitive conditions. one of the most important lessons, then, 
that we may take away from Spinoza’s account is that, in the absence 
of good cognitive conditions, an otherwise rational populace may well 
be reduced to a muddled mob.
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